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Two recent edited collections, Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech and Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, set out to explore the ways the secular operates  with,  not  in  opposition  to,  the  religious.  In  showing  how  secular conceptions of religion make possible certain forms of legal regulation and political governance  of  religious  action  and  expression,  the  collections make  an  important contribution to the resurgence of scholarly interest in religion and politics in the last 
   VOLUME17 NUMBER1 MAR2011 404 
decade.  At  the  same  time,  the  collections  also  reveal  the  complexities  inherent  in attempting to interrogate the ideological and institutional operations of the secular from  (various)  positions  in  the  academy  that  owe  their  prestige  and  privilege  to secular  epistemologies  of  critique  and  criticism  derived  from  Enlightenment philosophy.  In the introduction to Is Critique Secular?, Wendy Brown writes that the book aims to  ‘loosen critique’s  identity with secularism as well as surrender  its reliance on a notion of  secularism  itself  insulated  from critique’.  (13)  Secularism  is  able  to insulate  itself  from  critique  because  of  ‘the  Enlightenment  presumption  that  the true, the objective, the real, the rational, and even the scientific emerge only with the shedding of religious authority or “prejudice”’. (11) Because the shedding of religion is  equated  with  objectivity,  secular  speech  and  law  are  able  to  discursively  and institutionally  target religious behaviour  in a way that  is not ostensibly prejudiced or partial.  Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood  seek  to  expose  the prejudices of  secular critique  in  media  and  political  responses  to  the  Danish  Muhammad  cartoon controversy. This event  involved the publication in 2005 of cartoons of the Islamic prophet  Muhammad  in  the  Danish  newspaper  Jyllands­Posten.  The  cartoons  were subsequently  deemed  offensive  by  a  range  of  Muslim  organisations  as  well  as  a number  of  non‐Muslim  commentators.  The  publication  and  re‐publication  of  the cartoons  in  English‐language  newspapers  garnered  significant  media  attention because of the violent nature of some of the public protests against the newspapers by Muslim groups in European and non‐European countries. Asad  argues  that  the  cartoons  also  gained  media  currency  because  the protests  were  incorporated  into  a  narrative  that  positioned  Western  democratic principles  of  freedom  of  speech  in  opposition  to  Islamic  fundamentalism.  In particular, opposition to the cartoons expressed through the language of blasphemy1 reinforced  assumptions  that  Islamic  traditions  are  ‘rooted  in  a  more  restrictive system of ethics’ and do  ‘not allow the  freedom (especially  the  freedom of speech) provided and defended by liberal society’. (36) Following Foucault, Asad points out that the liberal concept of freedom is not absolute but involves the disciplining and regulation of subjects within conditions that are not of their own choosing. So, too, do particular Islamic principles of speech and civic duty structure and enable certain kinds of actions. (37) That pre‐emptive violence can be used to maintain a Western 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liberal  democratic  order  in  the  ‘war  on  terror’  while  the  use  of  violence  by  the protestors to preserve a different kind of public and civil order is considered archaic and  uncivilised  speaks  to  the monopoly  on  violence  that  liberal  democratic  states hold.  For  Asad,  then,  the  assumption  that  secular  criticism  leads  to  ‘freedom  and reason’ while religious criticism creates ‘intolerance and obscurantism’ (54) reflects an ideological perception ‘of European Muslims as not fully human because they are not  yet  morally  autonomous  and  politically  disciplined’  in  the  ways  of  liberal secularism. (56) Where Asad uses  the  cartoon controversy  to examine how secular  critique shapes what  is  included or excluded in the  liberal notion of  free speech, Mahmood argues that there was an ‘inability to understand the sense of injury expressed by so many Muslims’ in public commentary on the event. (68) She explains that an Islamic ontology  involves  experiencing  Muhammad  as  ‘inhabiting  the  world,  bodily  and ethically’.  (75)  This  is  a  different  ontological  approach  to  ‘the modern  concept  of religion—as  a  set  of  propositions  in  a  set  of  beliefs  to which  the  individual  gives assent’ in liberal societies. (72) Mahmood is unconvinced therefore that appealing to a liberal secular state for protection from religious vilification (in cases such as the Danish cartoon affair) is productive given the ‘distinctly different conceptions of the subject, religiosity, harm, and semiosis’ produced by Islamic and secular traditions. (88)  Legal  appeals  for  juridical  protection  serve  also  to  reinforce  the  state’s sovereign power to regulate and enforce particular kinds of religious belonging and expression. What is required is the ‘larger transformation of the cultural and ethical sensibilities of  the  Judeo‐Christian population that undergird the cultural practices of secular‐liberal law’ so that the non‐Christian religious identities of citizens cease to be points of contention in liberal democratic societies. (89)  Asad’s  and  Mahmood’s  essays  are  thoughtful,  incisive  and  important contributions  to  a  growing  body  of  work  that  contests  the  secular  arrogation  of truth, freedom, and reason for liberal modernity in opposition to a putative Islamic other.  Following  their  essays  is  a  response  from  Judith  Butler  that  provides  a summation of Asad’s and Mahmood’s key points, though framed within the former’s particular concern with norms and  ‘the contingent conditions under which we feel shock, outrage, and moral revulsion’.  (108) Asad and Mahmood each then respond to Butler. Although Butler’s contribution provides an  interesting and astute  (albeit 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brief)  discussion  of  the  ways  in  which  homonormativity  can  be  used  to  position Muslim migrants as outside the norms of liberal secularism, the series of responses that  complete  the  collection work  less  to  explode  or  deconstruct  secular  criticism than  they  do  to  reinforce  the  scholarly  defence  of  criticism.  For  example,  in  their very first paragraphs both Asad and Mahmood explain that they will not expand on the similarities or points of agreement with Butler and proceed to outline the latter's misreading of their work.  Asad’s  response  to Butler,  in what  is  the  conclusion  to  the book,  reiterates his  ‘“critique”  of  critique’  and  asks,  ‘When  does  intellectual  “critique”—as  against embodied  practice—come  to  be  regarded  as  the  indispensable  foundation  of knowledge?’  (144)  One  crucial  way  in  which  intellectual  critique  comes  to  be regarded  as  indispensable  knowledge  is  through  an  academic  publishing  industry that singles out and provides space for established scholars to comment publicly on issues  of  social  importance.  It  seems  to me  that  if  the  book  provides  a  critique  of secular critique then it is also an expression of that critique within the economies of academic labour. Asad reminds us that ‘secular critique … seeks to create spaces for new  truth …  by  destroying  spaces  that were  occupied  by  other  signs’.  (33)  If  the collection  succeeds  in  destroying  the  privileged  epistemological  status  of  secular truth  claims  then  it  does  so  only  to  reassert  the  textual  conventions  and expectations of academic (secular) critique. 
Varieties  of  Secularism  in  a  Secular  Age  features  a  collection  of  essays  that respond to and expand on the ideas presented in Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age.2 At almost nine hundred pages, Taylor’s mammoth book contains a historical genealogy of  the  development  of  secular  modernity  and  critical  analyses  of  contemporary forms  of  secular  and  religious  practice  as  well  as  philosophical  and  theological ruminations  on  the  current  state  of  belief.  Given  the  complexity  and  length  of Taylor’s work, Varieties  of  Secularism  serves  as  a  useful  introduction  to  the  book. The  different  uses  to  which  the  contributors  put  Taylor  in  examining  a  range  of secularisms also speaks to the variety of ideas, mediations, and propositions at work in A Secular Age.3  Notwithstanding  the  scope and  range of A Secular Age,  the  secularism  that Taylor is concerned with is the modern liberal kind. For Taylor this secularism is the accidental by‐product of internal reforms to Christianity that produced a conception 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of the self‐disciplining individual, (15)  ‘changed modes of marking time’, (7) and ‘a sharper  division  between  the  spiritual  and  the  physical’  realms.  (16)  While  this historical  genealogy  helps  us  to  understand  how  certain  (Protestant)  Christian ideals  and modes  of  expression  operate  from within  secularism,  Taylor’s  focus  on developments within a Latin Christendom seen to be constitutive of Europe and the West  neglects  how  non‐Christian  religions  and  religious minorities within  Europe shaped  the  internal  reforms  to  Christianity  that  Taylor maps  out.  Saba Mahmood addresses the analytical and political  implications of  this  focus. She writes that the equation of Europe with Christianity and the omission of non‐Christian religions in Taylor’s genealogy of secularism are  ‘akin to  the omission of  the history of slavery and  colonialism  from  accounts  of  post‐Enlightenment  modernity’.  (285)  Such omissions undermine what Mahmood  calls  ‘the  chimera of  interreligious dialogue’ expressed  in  the  conclusion  to  A  Secular  Age.  (298)  ‘How  would  one  imagine embarking  on  a  dialogue  when  the  other  is  not  even  acknowledged  in  political, existential, or epistemological terms [within the book]?’ (299) Another contribution, by Nilufer Gole, notes  that  the  renewal of  scholarly  interest  in  the  secular and  the religious  has  a  relation  to  Islam’s  heightened  visibility  in  media  and  political discourse  in  the  West.  (246)  The  resulting  contestation  and  transformation  of secular practices brought about by Islam’s visibility  in  liberal societies throws  into sharp  relief  how  academic  criticism  is  an  enterprise  intimately  connected  to  the West’s creation of its religious others. If the production of academic knowledge about the religious and the secular is made possible by particular kinds of historical and political  conditions,  then  the importance  of  interreligious  dialogue  as  a  condition  of  possibility  for  academic intervention  emerges  several  times  in  Varieties  of  Secularism.  In  an  eloquent afterward  to  the  collection,  Taylor writes  that  the meeting  and  exchange  of  ideas ‘can stand like firebreaks in a forest fire’ and that the  ‘particular political action’ of the moment  is  to  try  and  ‘multiply  those  firebreaks’.  (321) William  Connolly  also believes  there  is  ‘a pressing need …  to negotiate deep, multidimensional pluralism within  and  across  territorial  regimes’  (136)  in  order  to  guard  against  entrenched ‘minoritization and  fundamentalism’.  (140) The cultivation of  these  firebreaks and alliances  are  vital  given  that,  as  the  editors  of  the  book  note,  the  secular  and  the religious  have  emerged  as  intense  sites  of  conflict  in  contemporary  geopolitics. 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Grasping  these  conflicts  ‘depends  on  going  beyond  a  narrow  emphasis  on consciously held understandings and explicit institutional mechanisms’. (28) Going beyond the discursive and  institutional domain that holds the  liberal secular  state  to be  the only mechanism capable of  solving  interreligious  conflict  is difficult.  One  of  the  institutional  functions  of  liberal  secular  states  is  to  facilitate interreligious dialogue as a means of reducing religious conflict. Indeed the editors note  that  Taylor  has  participated  in  a  government  inquiry  with  this  aim.4  The problem  then  is  not  so  much  that  there  are  no  institutional  spaces  and  political imperatives  for  interreligious  dialogue  but  that  the  production  of  academic knowledge  aimed  at  explaining  the  contemporary  manifestations  of  secular  and religious  conflict  is  already  integrated  into  the  institutional  mechanisms  of secularism. Moreover, to think outside institutional spaces and to cultivate dialogue and  openness  to  those  of  different  faiths  requires  careful  consideration  and unhurried  communication  that  is  constrained  by  the  relentless  penetration  of neoliberalism  into  the  academy  and  elsewhere.  As  Simon  During  notes, neoliberalism renders  ‘all  individual  lives … largely extraneous to democratic state capitalism’s  economic/political  processes  and  cycles’.  (123)  Increasing  neoliberal demands for universities to accelerate the delivery of courses and the production of research also means that there is less incentive and time for the kinds of challenging and risky academic work that could engage meaningfully with complex secular and religious issues.  If the economies of time instantiated through neoliberal capital foreclose the possibilities  for  large‐scale  action  or  radical  ideas,  During  suggests  that  the mundane  comes  to  satiate  intellectual,  political  and  spiritual  desires  in  an  age  of neoliberalism.  In  contrast  to  Taylor’s  contention  that  individuals  lack  a  sense  of ‘fullness’ or  spiritual  fulfilment when belief becomes simply an option  in a  secular age,  During  argues  that  achieving  fullness  does  not  require  ‘an  orientation  to  the transcendental’.  (125)  ‘Today,  spiritual  gravity  may  inhere  in  the  self‐emptying contingencies through which we are concretely placed in history, nature, and place, and  for  that  reason  needs  no  other  home  than  the  immediate  and  the mundane’. (125) As I understand it, the mundane consists of an a‐critical existential disposition involving  the  simple  luxury  of  being,  with  no  intention  and  direction  beyond  the present  moment;  its  sheer  banality  and  contingency  makes  it  unable  to  be 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assimilated  into  a  neoliberal  regime.  In  other  words,  it  comprises  nothing  so intentional, precise and time‐consuming as the energies directed towards academic critique. 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—NOTES 1 Asad argues that the Western gloss of the protesters’ grievances as ‘blasphemy’ is slightly misleading and that a more accurate understanding of Muslim injury in relation to the cartoons would be ‘insult, harm, and offense’. (38) 2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2007. 3 Contributors not discussed here include Robert Bellah, John Milbank, Wendy Brown, Akeel Bilgrami, Colin Jager, Jon Butler, Jonathan Sheehan and Jose Casanova. 4 The resulting report, Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for 
Reconciliation, Government of Quebec, Quebec City, 2008 can be accessed at <www.accommodements.qc.ca/index‐en.html>. 
 
